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Special issue arising from the Third International
Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific
Reasoning and Applications
This special issue of the Journal of Applied Logic contains a selection of the papers
presented at the Third International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific
Reasoning and Applications (III CMSRA), which was held on 14–15 September 2003
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, chaired by Claudio Delrieux. The CMSRA workshop series
has provided an annual forum for bringing together practitioners in several fields involved
in the computational models of scientific reasoning (Logic, KR&R, Cognitive Sciences,
Epistemology and Theory of Science, among others), in order to exchange the results of
their ongoing research, share their experiences and speculate about their impact on the new
information technologies. Of the 21 papers appearing in the proceedings, 11 were invited
to participate in this issue with extended versions, for a second round of reviewing. Of
those that accepted the invitation 6 were selected for publication.
The papers included here illustrate several trends that may be of interest to those work-
ing in the computational models of scientific reasoning, and provide a good sample of the
different multidisciplinary approaches and interests, yet unified by the common aim of
applying Science to study Science itself.
This volume starts with Pierangelo Dell’Acqua and Luís Moniz Pereira’s contribution
Common-sense reasoning as proto-scientific agent activity. The authors model common-
sense reasoning in situations where it contains some of the ingredients typical of proto-
scientific reasoning. For this, the authors employ an integrative formal computational ma-
chinery for rational cooperative epistemic agents, where agents can update their own and
each other’s theories, which are comprised of knowledge, active rules, integrity constraints,
queries, abducibles, and preferences; they can engage in abductive reasoning involving
updatable preferences; set each other queries; react to circumstances; plan and carry out ac-
tions; and revise their theories and preferences by means of concurrent updates on self and
others. The application of proto-scientific reasoning in common-sense examples, modelled
by collections of rational agents, is worth pursuing as a model of collaborative scientific
theory development and refinement.
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The second paper, Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research
programmes, by Claudio Delrieux, develops a formal treatment for embedding abduction
in defeasible theories, in particular, abduction for the explanation of anomalous observa-
tions, i.e., observations that are contradictory with the current theory. The author discusses
some issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theo-
ries, and how to accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible
outcomes that a defeasible theory may face when confronted with new evidence, and an
application of the system as a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific
research programmes. In this representation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible the-
ory that draws predictions. When confronted with surprising or anomalous observations,
the programme protects itself by means of heuristic procedures, which are represented as
abductive inference procedures.
Lorenzo Magnani’s contribution, Reasoning through doing: epistemic mediators in sci-
entific discovery illustrates that some typical internal abductive processes are involved in
scientific reasoning and discovery (for example through radical innovations). The author
claims that even though recent epistemological and cognitive studies concentrate on the
concept of abduction as a means to originate and refine new ideas, this “traditional” cogni-
tive science and computational accounts concerning abduction aim to illustrate discovery
and creativity processes only in terms of theoretical and “internal” aspects, by means of
computational simulations and/or abstract cognitive models. Nevertheless, this work shows
that specially concrete manipulations of the external world constitute a fundamental sci-
entific procedure: by a process of manipulative abduction it is possible to build prostheses
(epistemic mediators) for human minds, by interacting with external objects and repre-
sentations in a constructive way. In this manner it is possible to create implicit knowledge
through doing and to produce various opportunity to find, for example, anomalies and fruit-
ful new risky perspectives. This kind of embodied and unexpressed knowledge holds a key
role in the subsequent processes of scientific comprehension and discovery.
The fourth paper, Measuring coherence using LP-models, by Carlos Oller, introduces
a technique for measuring the degree of (in) coherence of inconsistent sets of proposi-
tional formulas. The coherence of these sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal
models of those sets in G. Priest’s Logic of Paradox. The compatibility of the informa-
tion expressed by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be
measured with this technique. The author then addresses some objections against many-
valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for measuring (in)coherence. This work shows,
among other things, that a system of paraconsistent logic can have a rôle that goes beyond
the task of identifying valid forms of inference, and can be used as a tool for analyzing the
information contained in (possibly inconsistent) sets of formulas.
The following contribution, Semantic computations of truth based on associations al-
ready learned, by Patrick Suppes and Jean-Yves Béziau, is aimed to describe the computa-
tions with the mental images of words and other things underlying human common-sense
and everyday reasoning, taking in account in particular the time factor. This theory should
be able to explain the data gathered by experimentation, for example why it takes more
time to give a negative answer (with false or/and with not) than a positive one, be it true
or false. The general mechanism leading to a false or to a true reply should be the same,
since there seems to have no differences in nature in the computation of the result. The au-
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thors claim that Philosophical work on theories of truth (coherence theory, correspondence
theory, etc.), problems of direct reference, sense and denotation and so on, curiously are
not able to give an account of how humans perform truth statements, and even less why
humans are able to perform them so quickly. The key of these abilities, Suppes and Béziau
claim, is based on the use of associations, also called “semantics networks” or “associative
networks” in AI.
This volume is closed by Gregory Wheeler and Luís Moniz Pereira’s contribution Epis-
temology and Artificial Intelligence. Despite the generality of the title, it is focused at a
very specific claim: the idea of seeing epistemology and AI as complementary ways of
approaching the same set of issues. The authors show how AI and epistemology in the
end study the very same epistemic relations. Artificial Intelligence approaches the subject
from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks,
while epistemology does it from the perspective of understanding the properties of epis-
temic relations in terms of their conceptual properties. To illustrate their point, the authors
develop a formal representation of a class of non-monotonic inference forms found at
the heart of standard inferential statistics using a variation of default logic, called statis-
tical default logic. They discuss some semantics for default theories and logic programs,
enough to give a sketch of how the correspondence results are obtained. This example is
structurally analogous to an important class of relations that arise in contemporary the-
ories of knowledge. The authors therefore argue that practice in epistemology and in AI
should not be conducted in isolation. As can be seen from the success of the ongoing
CMSRA workshop these years, there is a growing community that strongly agrees with
that claim.
We would like to thank the people who made III CMSRA possible. Foremost is Javier
Legris, who chaired the local organizing committee, gave a very valuable help on the re-
viewing process, and co-edited the workshop proceedings. We also thank the members of
the program committee—which for the third consecutive year gave their support for this
meeting—and to the additional reviewers— all of which had to do much more work than
expected. Also we are grateful to Dov Gabbay, who agreed to this special issue.
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